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Who Said Nothing in This World is
Free? A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.:
Problems Presented, Solutions Explored,
and Answers Posed
BY RYAN C. EDWARDS*
INTRODUCTION
he Internet is a phenomenon that has slowly but surely begun to
touch nearly every aspect of our daily lives. No longer does one
have to stand in line at the airline ticket counter, fight the
shopping mall crowd around the holidays, or pay long distance chargesjust
to say hello to a friend. It can all be done online. The events of our world
are posted on the Internet as quickly as they happen. The days of sitting at
home and waiting for the evening news are, to some extent, over. Nearly
everything a person could possibly need is all at the click of a button.
Out of this vast expanse called cyberspace came an application, the
brainchild of a college dropout, that pushed all the wrong buttons of the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA"). An eighteen-year-
old computer wizard had devised a way by which music lovers all over the
world could share their music with each other. Out of this idea was born a
company, Napster, Inc. ("Napster"), which allowed users to access the
music libraries and hard drives of other users, all for the sole purpose of
swapping music. Nearly every song imaginable was now only amouse click
away. The RIAA's problem with the concept? This new way of swapping
music was absolutely free of charge, and use ofNapster was spreading like
wildfire.
Young people, particularly teenagers and college students, have always
had a particular fondness for free music. In the 1960s, the Grateful Dead
and other bands from the San Francisco Bay area routinely held free
* J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank Carl
D. Edwards and Sean W. Whitt for their constant encouragement and advice on this
Note, and especially Tracie L. Thomas, for her never-ending patience and support
throughout the publication process.
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concerts for their fans.' The Dead, who are perhaps the greatest touring
band in the history of music, actually allowed fans to make tapes of their
concerts for free.2 Despite this history of free music in decades past, today
one must realize that the artists who create and the labels that produce
music are not doing so simply for the love of music. Because artists and
labels are interested in making money, both need to have a financial
incentive to continue. The RIAA contents thatNapster has stolen away this
financial incentive-the royalties owed these artists and labels under
copyright law. Indeed, Mike Stoller, co-writer of one of the greatest rock
songs of all time, Elvis Presley's "Hound Dog," stated that "[e]ach time a
Napster user downloads a copy of a song I have composed, I am deprived
of the royalty that my work should have earned me."3
Due to these financial losses, the RIAA has filed suit against Napster,
alleging various copyright infringement claims.4 Due to the complexity and
novelty of the technology involved, the case presents many issues of first
impression to any court of law. The purpose of this Note is to encourage
those involved to adopt a business model in which Napster users pay a
small fee to swap music, as this seems to be the solution that satisfies the
concerns of all parties. Part I of this Note focuses on a description of the
Napster service and the clones it has spawned, describing in detail the
process by which users swap music files Part II discusses the substantive
law and legislative provisions involved in this suit, and touches on
problems with each as applied to the Napster service.6 Part III concentrates
on the judicial application of the law discussed in Part II to the Napster
case.7 Part IV explores forums of resolution and alternatives, noting the
drawbacks of each, and ultimately presses for the adoption of a "pay-for-
play" model forNapster. Again, in light of the difficulties Napster presents
to the legal system and other traditional means of resolution, an alternative
marketplace solution is proposed. As such, final adjudication of the matter
will have little effect on the arguments presented herein.
' John Gibeaut, Facing the Music, 86 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 36,41.
21d.
3 Mike Stoller, What Songs Might Never Have Been Witten... ?, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 12, 2000, at A29.
4 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd inpart and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
5See infra notes 9-46 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 47-169 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 170-339 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 340-414 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ADVENT OF PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING
A. The Napster Service
"Shawn Fanning was 18 when he wrote the code that changed the
world."9 Fanning, a college student, had grown tired of the endless dead
web links he came across in searching for MP3 files.'" He conceived a
program which would allow users to connect to each other directly, without
having to go through a centralized server. Although the concept had not yet
been christened with a name, it has since become, undoubtedly, the
"godfather" of the newly created peer-to-peer file sharing revolution. It
looks to be not only a musical phenomenon, but an entirely new program-
ming movement." The statement of one commentator, that "Fanning's
program already ranks among the greatest Internet applications ever, up
there with e-mail and instant messaging," 2 illustrates the influence and
importance of the Napster code.
But how, exactly, does the Napster service work? To begin, users may
download the necessary software from the Napster website for free. 3 Users
must then register with Napster by assigning a user name to themselves. 4
The software has a browser interface, and features a search engine, a
"hotlist" function, 5 and a chat function. 6 Napster keeps "clusters" of
servers that make up its network.'7 Users can communicate, using the
9 Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60.
10 Digital musicoften appears in the MP3 format, short for ISO-MPEG Audio
Layer-3, which was developed by the German engineering firm Fraunhofer H1S in
the late eighties. See id. at 63. Digital compression technology makes MP3s much
smaller than other digital music formats; as such, it takes less time to upload and
download MP3 files over the Internet. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896,901 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001).
11 See Greenfeld, supra note 9, at 64.
121d. at 62.
13 See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
14 Id. The user need not reveal his/her true identity to the service. Id.
'1 Id. The "hotlist" tool allows users to compile and store lists of other account
holders' user names. Id. This allows one user to obtain files from a particular other
known user, phrased more generally, the "hotlist" function allows auserto browse
another user's entire shared library, and permits the initial user to download files
directly from that list. See id. at 906.
6 Id. at 905.
17 Id.
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features listed above, only with those users that are assigned to their
"cluster."' 8 Users specify where they want their "shared" files to be stored,
and the files within the so-called "user library" are available to other users
of the service for download.19
If the user sets his available uploads to a number greater than zero, all
the MP3 files within that user's "library" automatically become available
to other Napster users.2° A user can then use the Napster search engine to
find the MP3 files he/she desires by using the featured search engine.2! ' The
Napster software contains a "file-name index," which tracks all the files
available at any given time, as users log on and off the system.' A user
types search terms relating to the music she desires in the fields provided
by the search engine.' In seconds, the Napster servers send that user a list
of files, compiled of users online at that moment, containing the search
terms requested.24
Once the user locates a file they desire, she double-clicks on the file,
and the software engages in dialogue between that user and the host user.'
Napster's central servers then obtain the required IP address information
from the host, and send that information to the requesting user.26 This, in
essence, allows the host and the requesting computers to communicate with
each other.2 A connection between the two users is established, and the
content of the MP3 file is transferred directly between the two users.'
Although the actual file transfer takes place between the two users
themselves, they would not be able to locate and communicate with each
other without being signed on to the Napster service.29
's Id.
19 See id.
21 Id. A user's "library" is only available to others when that user is online. Id.
Conversely, a user may only search for files among other users who are online at
that time. See id.
21 See id. at 906.
2Id.
2Id.
24 See id.
' See id. The host user is the user who makes the MP3 available for down-
loading. Id.
6Id. at 906-07.
27See id. at 907.
n Id.
29 See id. The file transfer process is the same for a user whether they use the
search engine or the "hotlist' function. See id. at 906. The "hotlist' function, as
stated earlier, grants a user the capability to look at another user's shared library.
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B. "Gnutella " Type Services
Although Napster presents several novel legal issues, the service is still
an entity which can be sued. Due to Napster's use of central servers, the
RIAA has a "real party" against which it may defend its copyrights. In the
wake ofNapster's popularity, however, several clones of the program have
appeared. 0 These clones seem to pose an even greater challenge to existing
copyright law than Napster itself.3
Unlike Napster, which uses central servers to aid in distributing files,32
neither Gnutella nor Freenet "rely on a central repository of information." 3
By utilizing a system which eschews a central server in favor of a "true"
peer-to-peer system,34 Gnutella and Freenet do not provide a target to be
sued. 5 Thus, it would seem that the only way to protect intellectual
property rights in light of Gnutella and Freenet would be to sue each
individual user 6.3 An examination of how Gnutella-based systems work
makes the technical differences apparent and illuminates the effect of this
difference.
Once Gnutella has been installed on a personal computer, a "hello"
message goes out from that system to a computer that is already on the
network, "letting them know that the first computer is onboard. They, in
turn, forward it to six more [computers], which forward it to five more
See id. The user may then begin the transfer process by selecting a file from that
list. Id.30 See Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The
EmergingLawofCommercial Transactions in Electronic CustomerData, 56 Bus.
LAW. 213, 236-37 (2000). Programs such as Gnutella and Freenet are much like
Napster, but they are available as open source code. See Andy Oram, The Value of
Gnutella and Freenet, WEBREVIEW, at http://www.webreview.com/pi/2000/
05 12 00.shtml (May 12, 2000). Open source code status means that a program
is licensed under a GNU general public license, and thus cannot have its open
status removed by later developers. See id.
3' See Winn & Wrathall, supra note 30, at 237-38; Oram, supra note 30, at
http://www.webreview.com/pi/2000/05_12_00.shtml; Whatis Gnutella?,GNUTELLA
NEWS, at http://www.gnutellanews.com/information/what_is._gnutella.shtml (last
visited Mar. 25, 2001) (boasting that "Gnutella can withstand a band of hungry
lawyers").
32 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text33 Winn & Wrathall, supra note 30, at 237.
1 See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text
3 Winn & Wrathall, supra note 30, at 237.
36 See id.
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[computers], and so on."3' When a particular file request is sent out through
an established network, the request continues to percolate until a computer
is found that has the file. At that point, the Gnutella software connects the
two computers directly, and the file is downloaded.39 It is important to note
the lack of central servers in the Gnutella process,' as this appears to be the
crucial difference between Napster and its clones.
Shortly after Napster's success became apparent, the code that built
Napster was released and rebuilt as Gnutella, and other clones have
followed suit.4 More than one theme appears to be common among all of
these services and their users. First, they believe that they cannot be
stopped from swapping music, whether pirated or not, over the Internet! 2
Second, many users of peer-to-peer technology feel that music on the
Internet should be free in any event.43 Indeed, many proclaim that copyright
law should not come into play at all." Despite these developments, the
RIAA is presently focusing on services such as Napster, which it suspects
37 Greenfeld, supra note 9, at 62.38 See id.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 63.
41 See Brad Cawn, The Shape of Things to Come: Will Downloadable Music
Force a Massive Overhaul of the Recording Industry?, UR, Oct 8-Nov. 4, 2000,
at 23, 24. N-tella and Gnotella are examples of Gnutella clones. Id.
42 "'We're legitimate, nihilistic media terrorists, as history will no doubt
canonize us,' boasts Nullsoft's home page." Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 37. Nullsoft
is an America Online (AOL) subsidiary that developed a search engine that AOL
has since removed "amid concern that it could illegally obtain copyrighted music
files for users." Id. Nullsoft's statement "[echoes] the familiar techno-geek mantra
that anarchy rules the Internet," and Freenet's system claims to be "'a near perfect
anarchy."' Id. at 37,41.
43 A poll of potential jurors in the Napster case revealed that 41.3% of those
surveyed believed that music over the Internet should be free. Victoria Slind-Flor,
Jurors Polled on Net, IP Law: Many Want to Copy Music, Moviesfor Free, NAT'L
L.J., Oct 16, 2000, at Al. The survey found that those aged sixteen to twenty-four
were the most likely to say that Internet music should be free. Id.; see also Robert
Kuttner, 0, Freedom, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 28, 2000, at 4, 2000 WVL 4739388,
http://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print(Vl 1/19/kuttner-r.html (stating "[t]he
battle cry of the Napster generation is that information is naturally free").
" See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 41. A quote on aNapster website online forum
from a user named "Daveld" reads: "'[w]hat the hell does copyright law have to
do with me, or any other laws of man for that matter?.. . If I don't want to follow
a law, I won't."' IK
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have a motive for profits in the future.45 The RIAA feels that such services
prey on users who believe that music on the Internet should be free.46
II. THE LEGAL BATTLES OVER
PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING: RELEVANT SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Substantive Law Background
1. The General Problems with
Traditional Copyright Law as Applied to Napster
Among the more interesting aspects of peer-to-peer file sharing are the
implications it poses for traditional copyright law.47 The framers of the
Constitution believed copyrights to be of the utmost importance, as
illustrated by the power given to Congress to "'promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. ""
As copyright law developed, courts began establishing the doctrine of"fair
use," which allows others to use copyrighted materials without the owner's
consent.49 In essence, the doctrine allows persons to make a de minimus use
of copyrighted materials while it prohibits mass production."0
The problem with these staples of traditional copyright law is that the
Framers never could have imagined "the unprecedented scale of reproduc-
tion allowed by increasingly sophisticated computer software that makes
the once-dreaded photocopier as benign as a chisel and stone tablet. 51
Michael Rhodes, the Cooley Godward intellectual property lawyer who is
45 See id.
46Id.
47 See generally Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window Onto the
Future of Copyright Law in the Internet Age, 18 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 755 (2000) (exploring the ramifications of the Napster controversy on
copyright law).
4 Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 39 (quoting U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).49 The beginningsof fairuse in the United States are found inFolsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901).
10 See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 39. For example, quoting from and citing to a
copyrighted work in a book review would qualify as fair use. Id. On the other hand,
making massive amounts of copies of a work and distributing the same would not
qualify as fair use. Id.
51Id.
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representing MP3.com, Inc.,52 states that "[t]he premise of copyright is to
track and prevent reproduction.... What happens with the Internet is that
you get the functional equivalent but not a 'reproduction' of a particular
work."'53 Similarly, "[t]he challenge that's raised by the new media is that
we are trying to apply some of our conventional rules involving conven-
tional media to the new media., 54
2. Contributory Infringement
The Napster service has been sued for contributory infringement of
copyrights by the RIAA. 5 As an initial matter, in order for a plaintiff "[t]o
prevail on a contributory... infringement claim, [that] plaintiff must show
direct infringement by a third party."56
An analysis of direct infringement begins by noting that "the law of
copyright protects 'original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 7 The owner of the copyright has a bundle of
2 MP3.com, Inc. is a service that was also sued by record labels. UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Partial
summary judgment was granted against MP3.com, Inc. for infringing on
copyrights. Id. at 353. Damages were set at $25,000 per CD, or roughly $118
million. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1376,
1381 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
53Brenda Sandburgfs it Live, or is it the lnternet?, RECORDER(San Francisco),
Spring 2000, at S6, WESTLAW, RECORDER-SF Database, 3/2000.
54Richard Lee, DigitalDealings: The Internet is Changingthe Way Information
is Distributed., Will the Law Manage to Catch Up?, RECORDER (San Francisco),
July 2000, at S4, WESTLAW, RECORDER-SF Database, 7/2000 (presenting an
interview with several intellectual property and copyright experts). Traditional
copyright infringement is governed by 17 U.S.C. See generally 17 U.S.C. (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999).
55 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
56 1d. at 911.
57 Alfred P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Contributory Infringement: Software
Architects Beware! What You Don't Know Just Might Hurt You (Part H),
COMPUTERLAW., May 1994, at5 (citing 17U.S.C.A § 102(a) (West Supp. 1993)).
Protected works fall into the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
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"exclusive rights?" regarding the work, not the copies, which include the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images ofamotion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
A direct infringer of a copyright is one who violates any of the exclusive
rights listed above.'
"[C]ontributory infringement is a form of secondary liability ....
This form of liability "evolved from the recognition that parties other than
the direct infringer often play roles in the infringement." Once direct
infringement is established, a contributory infringer is "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another." 3
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).58 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
59 Id.60 See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. IV 1999).
61 John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement andRelated Theories ofSecondary
Liability for Trademark Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101, 103 (1994).
6Id. at 104.
1 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. ColumbiaArtists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). The Gershwin court discussed Screen Gems-
Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
which held that a radio station, along with a participating advertising agency and
packaging agent, could be held liable as contributory infringers. See Gershwin, 443
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For example, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,6 vendors at a
swap meet were selling records without the copyright owner's permission."
The court there held that the operators of the swap meet were contributory
infringers.' It was established, as required, that the vendors were direct
infringers.67 Since the operators provided the site and facilities where the
activities took place, they were secondarily liable.68 Although Fonovisa
"did not involve the Internet, it has influenced the legal analysis of
contributory liability in cyberspace." 9
3. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
In addition to contributory copyright infringement, Napster has also
been sued by the RIAA under a theory of vicarious copyright
infringement."0 The first important aspect to note about vicarious copyright
infringement is that, unlike contributory infringement, knowledge on the
part of the defendant is not a required element.7' The doctrine is "an
.outgrowth of... respondeat superior,"72 and liability will be found when
the defendant "(1) has the right and ability to control the infringer's acts
and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement." 3
Vicarious infringement finds its roots in the" 'dance-hall' cases from the
Depression Era, where operators of entertainment venues were held liable
for the infringing performances of others because the operators: (1) could
F.2d at 404-05. Liability was contingent upon an ultimate finding that the radio
station had knowledge, or reason to know, that advertisements played on their
station were for the sale of infringing records. See id. at 405.
1 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auctions, Inc. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
65Id. at 261.
6See id. at 264.67 See id.
6Id.
69 Berschadsky, supra note 47, at 766 (citing Timothy L. Skelton, Comment,
Internet Copyright Infringement and ServiceProviders: The Casefor a Negotiated
RulemakingAlternative, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 219, 252 (1998)).
71 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal.
2000), ajfd inpart and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
71 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12.04[A][1]).
7 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,306 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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control the premises; and (2) obtained a direct financial benefit from the
audience, who paid to enjoy the infringing performance."74
As for the first element of vicarious liability, the "control" element, a
plaintiff can show that a defendant exercised control by pointing out that
the defendant imposed certain rules and regulations on the infringer.75 The
plaintiff may also satisfy the element by showing that the defendant
"controlled the access customers had to the activities of the infringer;"76
"possessed a right to terminate the infringer's activities; 77 or "generally
promoted the commercial activities on its premises."8 As a practical
matter, this element appears easily satisfied by the plaintiff. As cases
suggest:
[E]ven a nominal indicia of the right and ability to control users-such as
a user agreement that contains subjective and arbitrary restrictions on
users, or a pattern of disabling users' accounts or yanking user con-
tent--could, when aggregated, lead to a finding that the website has the
'right and ability to control' the infringing user.79
The real debate comes with proof of the second factor-the "direct
financial benefit" by the defendant. Most cases concerning financial benefit
center upon whether the defendant receives a"fixed fee" or a fee that varies
based on the amount of infringement committed by others, and courts have
been sharply divided over this issue.0 Courts will find vicarious infringe-
ment where the fee received by a defendant varies with the amount of
infringing activities occurring." Courts have also traditionally found that
74Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Using the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act to Limit Potential Copyright Liability Online, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
18, 25 & n.69 (2000), at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i4/articlel.html.
75 See id. 26 (citing Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 1314, 1329 (D. Mass. 1994)).
76Id. (citing Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1329).
"Id. (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262).
I d. (citing Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1329).
79Eric Goldman, A Fresh Look at Web Development and HostingAgreements,
570 PRACTISING L. INST. PAT. 91, 131 (1999).
'o Friedman & Buono, supra note 74, 26.
81 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307-08
(2d Cir. 1963) (stating that where the amount of rent a landlord received varied
based on the amount of infringing sales by a tenant, vicarious infringement will be
found).
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if a "flat fee" is charged by a defendant, vicarious liability should not be
found.8"
Charging aflat fee, however, will not necessarily save a defendant from
vicarious infringement. In Polygram International Publishing v. Nevada!
TIG, Inc., 3 for example, the court found that despite the fixed fee charged
by atrade show organizer, the organizers benefitted from the performances,
which helped make the show a financial success." Similarly, in Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,85 the court found that financial benefit could
be shown "where infringing performances enhance the attractiveness ofthe
venue to potential customers. 8 6
4. Fair Use and Substantial Non-infringing Use
The doctrine of fair use is a defense to a copyright infringement claim,
and it strikes a balance of sorts between protecting the copyright owner's
exclusive rights and the interest of the public in the free flow of informa-
tion. 7 While the law is certainly interested in protecting a copyright owner,
the primary purpose of a copyright is to promote leaming and culture for
the public welfare." As such, the public has a limited right to use copy-
righted works.89
The "black letter" of fair use is found in a combination of case law and
statutory provisions. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court declared that "[a]ny individual may
reproduce a copyrighted work for a'fair use'; the copyright holder does not
82 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Sen's.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to find defendant
Netcom vicariously liable because it charged its users a fixed fee).
13Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1314.
84See id. at 1330-33.
85 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
16 Id. at 263. These cases are especially noteworthy in the application of the
second factor to the Napster case, as Napster charges not a fixed fee or a varying
fee, but no fee at all. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,905
(N.D. Cal. 2000), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
87 Deborah Hartnett, Note, A New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstituting the
Fair Use Doctrine, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 267,267 (1989).
88 See Brandon G. Williams, Note, James Brown v. In-Frin-Jr: How Moral
Rights Can Steal the Groove, 17 ARiz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 651, 655-56 (2000).
'9 See Hartnett, supra note 87, at 269.
90 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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possess the exclusive right to such a use."91 Or, as one commentator
phrased it: "Fair use is the privilege to use copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without consent." Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 107 lists
six different circumstances "in which use might be considered 'fair':
criticism; comment; news reporting; teaching; scholarship or research; and
parody."'9 It should be noted that the infringement defendant has "the
burden of proving [the] affirmative defenses [of fair use]."'
In addition, § 107 provides a list of factors to be considered in
determining if a use is a fair one:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 95
The § 107 fair use factors find theirroots in Justice Story's now famous
opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,96 which courts today frequently cite as the first
American case to recognize the doctrine.' In Folsom, the plaintiffs owned
the copyrights of over seven thousand pages of President George Washing-
ton's writings, which they compiled into a twelve volume set.98 The
defendant had taken several excerpts from the plaintiffs' protected works,
and had inserted them into his work verbatim.99 The court found that, in
91id. at 433.
1 Robert G. Krupka, Copyright Infringement Litigation Basics 2000, 599
PRACTIsING L. INST. PAT. 455, 466 (Lindsay E. Dinn ed., 2000).
9 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
1 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affid in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11 th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "it is clear that the burden of proving fair use is always on the putative
infringer").
95 17 U.S.C. § 107.96 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901).
9
"See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
475 n.27 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.
99 Id.
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total, some one-third of defendant's work-over three hundred and fifty
pages-was. directly taken from the plaintiffs' works."e
Justice Story began by making a clear distinction between two different
types of uses of copyrighted material. In the first type, a reviewer of a work
"may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism." 'e Conversely, the second type of use involves citing "the most
important parts of [a] work,... not to criticise, but to supercede the use of
the original work, and substitute the review for it."" It is with this latter
type of use that copyright piracy is found. 3
The quantity of the material taken, Justice Story believed, was a poor
way to decide whether a copyright had indeed been infringed upon'°4
Instead, courts should examine the value of the excerpted material. 5 He
stated:
[I]n deciding questions of this sort, [we must] look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish
the profits, or supercede the objects, of the original work. Many mixed
ingredients enter into the discussion of such questions.106
A quick comparison reveals that Justice Story's factors are the precursors
of § 107's factors." 7
Indeed, nearly one hundred thirty-five years after the Folsom decision,
in 1976, Congress adopted the § 107 fair use factors employed by courts
today, using Folsom as its guide.'08 Congress made it clear that it did not
intend to change fair use in any way, stating that "the legislature only
intended to recognize the privilege statutorily, to 'restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way." ,,109 After the promulgation of§ 107, courts, in facing a wide array of
100 Id01 Id. at 344.
1021d. at 344-45.
103 Id.
'4 See id. at 348.
10 Id.
107 Compare Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348, with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
'0 SeePub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2546 (1976) (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)).
" Sonia Das, Note, The Availability of the Fair Use Defense in Music Piracy
and Internet Technology, 52 FED. COMM. L.J 727,734 (2000) (citing H.R. REP.
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fair use claims, have continued to apply the doctrine on a case-by-case
basis, with each factor weighing differently in any given dispute."'
A deeper discussion of each fair use factor is useful in understanding
the arguments made by Napster under the doctrine. The first factor is "the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit education purposes."'1" The ultimate
question with regard to the first factor is "whether the secondary and
primary uses are so similar in nature that one can serve as a substitute for
the other."112
One should look to how each use is being employed; for example, if the
primary use and the secondary use are both for educational purposes,
substitution is more likely to occur."1 If a defendant's use of a work is
found to be equivalent to a market substitution, then the copying is
infringing, and the fair use defense should fail. 4
In addition to substitution, the issue of transformation "lies at the heart
of fair use.1.1. When deciding whether a work has been "transformed," one
should look to whether "the new work merely supplants the original 'or
instead, adds something new with a different purpose or a different
character.' ,1 6 A finding of significant transformation can be of great help
to infringement defendants, as it"eclipse[s] the significance of commercial-
ism in making a fair use determination."1 7
The second factor is the "nature of the copyrighted work. ' .1 .Generally,
a work that is factual in nature will receive less protection than one that is
more creative in nature. 9 The second factor thus looks at how much
creativity went into the work. 20 One commentator has summed up the
No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)).
110 See id.
"1 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
'
1 2 Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright
Fair Use:.A Princ ;ledandPredictableBody ofLaw, 24 LOY. U. CHI.L.J. 143, 166
(1993).
113 Id.
14 See Michael G. Anderson et al., Market Substitution and Copyrights: Pre-
dicting Fair Use Case Law, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 33, 40 (1993).
"' Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doc-
trinefor Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. RFV. 107, 162 (2001) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
'
16 Id. (citing Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579).
117 Id. (citing Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579).
11 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1994).
119 See Anderson & Brown, supra note 112, at 168-69.
12 See Okediji, supra note 115, at 165.
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sliding scale of protection based on creativity thusly: creative works such
as novels, dramas, paintings, sonotas and poems receive plenary protection;
compilations, such as directories or anthologies, receive limited protection;
derivative works, such as motion pictures based on novels, also receive
limited protection. 21
The third factor is the "amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."" As Justice Story noted
in Folsom, the quantity of the work used by the alleged infringer cannot be
the sole inquiry of fair use; however, he recognized that it should be at least
a factor in the equation."23 One question that mediates this balancing of
quantity is whether the alleged infringer took no more than the amount
needed to make his/her use of the protected work. 4"The larger the volume
... of the portion copied, the more likely it is that the secondary use will
be found to infringe."'" In looking at the quantity copied, the court in
essence asks whether the secondary use could be a substitute for the
primary one. 26 For example, in Marcus v. Rowley,27 the plaintiff had made
a cookbook for use in his class, and the defendant had made a copy of just
under half of the book.2 8 The record showed that the defendant's copy was
"such an effective substitute for plaintiffs original work that one student
who enrolled in the plaintiff's cooking class, and who had a copy of
defendant's [cookbook] packet, actually refused to purchase the original
cookbook." '129 This finding of full substitution weighed heavily in the
court's denial of fair use to the defendant in Rowley. 3'
The fourth factor is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work."'' The market effect factor is "the final,
most important, and most obvious way to examine the problem of market
substitution for an original work." '132 Indeed, the market effect factor is
12 1 See L. Ray Patterson, Regents Guide to Understanding Copyright and Edu-
cational Fair Use, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 243,256 (1997).
122 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
'1 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
14 See Okediji, supra note 115, at 166.
1' Anderson & Brown, supra note 112, at 171.
126See id. at 171-72.
127 Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
'28See id. at 1173.
"9 Anderson & Brown, supra note 112, at 171 (citing Rowley, 695 F.2d at
1177).
130 See Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1179.
131 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1997).
132 Anderson & Brown, supra note 112, at 174.
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closely related to the substitution concept considered in the quantity factor,
because "a decrease in the demand for a product is often a direct result of
a substitute product being introduced." ' Although the burden of persua-
sion lies with an alleged infringer when fair use is pled,' as an initial
matter, copyright owners must "establish 'with reasonable probability' a
causal connection between the infringement and the alleged harm."'35
Examples of sufficient proof would be actual loss of revenue, impairment
of the potential market for original or derivative works, and the effect on
the value of the copyright for adaptation purposes and the like.'36 The
copyright owner need only establish that the secondary use could affect the
potential market forthe primary use; the burden then shifts to the defendant
to show that the harm alleged would have occurred even in the absence of
the copying. 37
The doctrine of "substantial non-infringing use" was first applied to
copyright law in the landmark Supreme Court case of Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.' The Court explained that in the
area of patent law many cases have denied "patentee[s] any right to control
the distribution of unpatented articles unless they are 'unsuited for any
commercial noninfringing use."" It followed, then, in the Court's
opinion, that"' [a] sale of an article which though adapted to infringing use
is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a
contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of com-
merce.""' The doctrine has also become known, due to the language
133 Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
566 (1982)).
"3 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
131 Vincent H. Peppe, Fair Use of Unpublished Materials in the Second Circuit:
The Letters ofthe Law, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 417,442 (1988) (citing Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 567).
1' See id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567).
131 See id. at 443 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567).
138 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441
(1984). The court acknowledged that the doctrine was one usually invoked in
patent law, but found patent and copyright law similar enough to apply same to
copyright law. Id. at 441-42.
139 Id. at 441 (citing Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176,
198 (1980)).
11 Id. (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled on
other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502,517 (1917)).
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above, as the "staple article of commerce doctrine." 141 At the outset, it must
be recognized that the staple article of commerce doctrine only provides a
defense to contributory infringement, not vicarious infringement. 42
Sony came about in the wake of the introduction of the Betamax video
recording system.143 The copyright holders of certain television programs
filed suit against the Sony Corporation, as manufacturer of the Betamax
recording device, and alleged that it should be held contributorily liable for
the copying and recording of the programs by consumers.'" After setting
forth and discussing the staple article of commerce doctrine, the Court
stated that it "need not explore all the different potential uses of the
machine [to] determine whether or not they would constitute infringe-
ment."'" Rather, the Court found that the activity of "time shifting"' was
one that was both substantial and non-infringing. 47
Sony also clearly explained that the result would likely be different if
the Betamax machine was used to make copies that were sold for commer-
cial and/or profit making purposes.'" As the facts stood, however, it was
clear that time shifting was a "noncommercial, nonprofit activity.
'1 49
The staple article of commerce doctrine, as applied to copyright, is an
interesting notion, and some situations that might otherwise seem trouble-
some fit neatly under the doctrine. 5 ' A library, for example, that allows
public use photocopier machines on the premises could be found
contributorily liable for infringement if patrons are illicitly copying
materials.'' Since a photocopier has substantial non-infringing uses,
41A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affid in part and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
142 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23 (9th Cir.
2001).
143 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-20.
144Id. at 420.
145Id. at 442.
14 Time shifting, the Court explained, was "the practice of recording a program
to view it... at a later time." See id. at 423. The Court stated that a viewer might
choose to time shift because they were not at home, doing other things, or watching
another program that happened to be on at the same time. Id.
147 See id. at 446-47 & 446 n.28.
4 See id. at 449.
149 Id.
50 See Edward A. Cavozos & Coe F. Miles, Copyright on the WWW: Linking
and Liability, 4 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 32 (1997), at http://www.richmond.edu/
jolt/v4i2/Cavazos.html.
151 ld.
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however, the library is saved from infringement liability.1 Napster, as will
be seen, is not so easily saved under the doctrine. This is because peer-to-
peer file sharing is a concept that was, simply put, unimaginable at the time
of Sony.
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act5
With the Internet becoming a mainstay in the lives of the American
public, and with the attendant newfound ease in downloading pictures,
music, and all types of software, copyright law appeared to be in trouble.
Online service providers,"5 also known as "OSPs" or "ISPs," came
knocking on Congress's door for answers to the following question:
"Should a company that provides Internet access... be held directly liable
for the copyright infringing acts of a customer?"'5 The providers also
wanted to know what the answer might be if they had no idea that copyright
infringement was occurring," largely due to the fact that they might
"easily commit copyright-infringing acts with little or no knowledge of the
action. 157
Due in large part to the ISPs' concerns, Congress enacted the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")" in October of 1998.2 The
DMCA added Chapter 12 to Title 17 of the United States Code, and gave
copyright owners new protection---"causes of action that are different than
152 See id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 108(f)(1) (West 1996)). Applying that section,
the library probably need not worry about this type of liability, as the photocopy
machine is likely being operated unsupervised, and a notice would likely be posted
warning potential infringers. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (1994).
153 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
1' ISPs are entities that provide servers that give millions of users access to the
Internet See Justin Williamson, Note, Online ServiceProvider CopyrightLiabiliy:
Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act the Answer?, 88 KY. L.J. 987, 993-94
(2000). For example, a web page designer who wishes to create a new page will
need to obtain access to the Internet through an ISP, such as America Online. See
id.
'1 Christian C.M. Beams, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service
Providers: Problem Solved.. .for Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 824 (1999).
156 See id.
I- Williamson, supra note 154, at 984.
158 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
159 Id.
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those traditionally litigated." 60 Additionally, the DMCA gives ISPs more
certainty in the area of copyright infringement and, if they qualify, may also
give them immunity from copyright infringement' These defenses are
contained in the "safe harbor" provisions of the DMCA, 62 which Napster
has attempted-to this point unsuccessfully-to use in its current suit.
The "safe harbors" are generally divided into four categories."'
The transitory digital network communications safe harbor165 comes
into play when "the OSP acts as nothing more than a conduit. Nothing is
stored for any length oftime...." As an initial matter, in order to invoke
the protection of § 512(a), a defendant must prove that it is a service
provider "transmitting, routing or providing connections for, material
through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider."67 After establishing this, the provider must further prove that:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of
a person other than the service provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is
carried outthrough an automatedtechnical process without selection ofthe
material by the service provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material
except as an automatic response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of
such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated
recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a
manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer
period of time than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing,
or provision of connections; and
160 Brian R. Socolow & James R. Guerette, Digital Millennium Copyright Inter-
preted, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 2000, at S7.
161 See id.
162 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1999).
'
63 See infra notes 255-80 and accompanying text
164The four categories are: (a) transitory digital network communications, (b)
system caching, (c) information residing on systems or networks at the direction
of users, and (d) information location tools or "links." 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d). For
the purposes of this Note, only § 512(a) is relevant.
165 See id. § 512(a).
16 Beams, supra note 155, at 841.
167 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
[VOL. 89
2000-20011 WHO SAID NoTHING IN THIS WORLD IS FREE?
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without
modification of its content'
The five elements an ISP must meet appear to be a "brainstorm" of all the
different ways that that same ISP could become aware that copyrighted
material was being illegally passed through it."9 Again, an understanding
of this provision is crucial to an understanding of a substantial part of
Napster's defense.
Im. APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN
A&MRECORDS, INC. v NAPSTER, INC. 70
A. The District Court Opinion
1. Contributory Infringement
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel was called upon to decide whether an
injunction should be issued against Napster enjoining it from "engaging in
or assisting others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
distributing copyrighted music without the express permission of the rights
owner."17' In order to issue this preliminary injunction, Judge Patel needed
to find that the plaintiffs had either shown "(1) a combination of probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that
serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in [their]
favor."' Patel began by considering the RIAA's success on its contribu-
tory infringement claim.
As discussed above, a claim of contributory infringement has two
elements: (1) knowledge on the part of the defendant of direct infringement,
and (2) material contribution to the infringement by the defendant."7 The
court found direct infringement by Napster users early in the opinion,
noting that "virtually all Napster users engage in the unauthorized
downloading... of copyrighted music; as much as eighty-seven percent of
6 Id. § 512 (a)(1)-(5).
'9See Beams, supra note 155, at 842.
'
70A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affld in part and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
71 Id. at 900.
172 Id. at 911 (citing Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR Realty, Inc.,
204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2000)).
1 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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the files available on Napster may be copyrighted, and more than seventy
percent may be owned... by the plaintiffs."1 4 After this finding, Judge
Patel needed to find knowledge on the part of Napster of the infringement.
The RIAA presented evidence that swayed Judge Patel into finding
actual knowledge on the part of Napster, the most notable of which was a
document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker. 5 That document
stated that Napster users "are exchanging pirated music,"7 6 and that
"[Napster is] not just making pirated music available but also pushing
demand."7 The RIAA also explicitly informed Napster at one point that
there were more than twelve thousand infringing files on the service.7
Armed with this information, the court found actual knowledge on the part
of Napster 7 9
As for material contribution, the court analogized the Napster software
with the swap meet in Fosnovia, Inc. v. Cheny Auction, Inc.' "The swap
meet provided support services like parking, booth space, advertising and
clientele." ' Similarly, the court reasoned, Napster supplies the software,
search engines, central servers "and means of establishing a connection
between users' computers. Without [these] support services... Napster
users could not find and download the music they want with the ease of
which defendant boasts."'11 Faced with this analogy, Napster cited more
contemporary cases in which website operators were held not to materially
contribute by posting links that led to infringing material.'m The court
174 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
175 See id. at 918.
176 Id.
1" Id.
'
7 Id. The court also found constructive knowledge on the part of'Napster, as
its executives had recording industry experience. Id. at 919. Napster did not dispute
that it "possessed enough sophistication about intellectual property laws to sue a
rock band that copied its logo." Id. Finally, Napster's executives promoted the
website with screenshots listing infringing files. Id.
179 See id. at 918.
' See id. at 919-20 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259
(9th Cir. 1996)).
"I1 Id. at 920 (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264).
182 Id.
'
3 See id. Napster cited Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry,
75 F. Supp. 2d 1290,1293 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that posting links to infringing
websites did not materially contribute to infringement by website operators), and
Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998),
available at 1998 WL 906644 (stating that multiple linking does not constitute
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rejected this analogy, stating that "Napster provides its users with much
more than hyperlinking [to other websites]; Napster is an integrated service
designed to enable users to locate and download MP3 music files."'" As
such, the court found Napster was materially contributing to unlawful
conduct." With both elements of contributory infringement satisfied, the
court held that the plaintiffs would likely prevail on the claim." 6
2. Vicarious Infringement
A plaintiff in a vicarious infringement claim must show that a
defendant(1) has control over users committing direct infringement and (2)
is obtaining a direct financial benefit from the infringement.'" As for the
control element, Napster argued to the court that it was "technologically
difficult, and perhaps infeasible,"' 8 for it to distinguish between legal and
illegal file swapping. "89 The plaintiffs countered by arguing thatNapster did
in fact supervise its users and the court agreed, stating that Napster had
taken "pains to inform the court of its improved methods of blocking users
about whom rights holders complain."'" The court found that these
arguments amounted to an admission by Napster that it "can, and some-
times does, police its service,'.. and found that Napster had "the right and
ability to supervise its users' infringing conduct."'"
The plaintiffs attempted to prove the direct financial benefit element of
vicarious liability by citing to several cases in which courts found the
element satisfied even when defendant made no profit from its activities."
substantial participation in any infringement where the linking website does not
mention the fact that Internet users could, by following the links, find infringing
material on another website). Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
'1 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
18s See id.
186 Id.
'
8 7 See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
'
8 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
189 Id.
190 Id.
9 See id. at 921.
192 See id.
191 See id. The RIAA cited Walden Music, Inc. v. C.H. W., Inc., No. 95-4023-
SAC, 1996 WL 254654, at *5 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 1996) (stating that the fact that
defendants' entrepreneurial enterprise was not making a profit was no defense to
copyright infringement allegations), MajorBob Music v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475,
480 (SD. Ga. 1994) (holding that a bar received financial benefit from perfor-
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The court agreed with the rationale of these cases, reasoning that by
offering more and more music for free, Napster would increase its user
base."' Further, Napster had plans to monetize its service by deriving
revenue from its user base, "through one of several... revenue models."'95
Judge Patel went on to find that Napster did benefit financially from the
infringement, and having found the first factor of vicarious liability
satisfied as well, held that the RIAA had shown a reasonable likelihood of
success on its claim.Y6
3. The Defenses of Fair Use and Substantial Non-infringing Use
Fair use and substantial non-infringing use are defenses to a claim of
copyright infiringement. 97 Judge Patel determined that "all four 'fair use'
factors.98 set forth in the Copyright Act" were in favor of the plaintiffs.'"
Under the first factor-the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education
purposes-Judge Patel acknowledged that "downloading MP3 files does
not transform the copyrighted music,"2 '0 but stated that the court was bound
under Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music2"' to determine whether the use was
commercial." 2 Judge Patel stated that while downloading and uploading
music via MP3s was not a "paradigmatic commercial activity," it wasn't
"personal use in the traditional sense" either.2 3
mances on its premises, and that "an enterprise is considered to be 'profit making'
even if it never actually yields a profit"), and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hobi, Inc.,
CIV.A. Nos. 92-228-B, 92-657-B, 1993 WL 404152, at *3 (M.D. La. June 24,
1993) (holding defendant vicariously liable because, even though it did not make
a profit, it aspired to make one), aff'd, 20 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 1994). Napster, 114
F. Supp. 2d at 921.
" See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
195 Id.
196 See id. at 921-22.
'
9 7 See supra notes 87-152 and accompanying text.
198 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); supra note 95 and accompanying text.
'Judge Patel Issues Written RulingExplaining NapsterDecision, ANDREWS
INTELL. PROP. LrrIG. REP., Aug. 16,2000, at 3, WESTLAW, ANIPLR database.200 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
201 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The Court held
that finding out whether the new work transforms the copyrighted work is the main
goal of the first factor. Id. at 579. The Court further held that a finding of
commercial use weighs against, but does not preclude, a finding of fair use. See id.
at 584; see also Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.2 2 See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
203 Id.
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The activities that occurred on the Napster service were not sales or
profit-motivated activities, but "[a]t the very least, a host user sending a file
cannot be said to engage in a personal use when distributing that file to an
anonymous requester."204 CitingSegaEnterprises, Ltd. vMPH_,,5 Judge
Patel stated that the fact that a Napster user gets something for free that
they would normally have to pay for suggests commercial activity.2' As for
the second factor of the fair use test-the nature of the copyrighted work-
the court found that copyrighted musical compositions were "creative in
nature, ... which cuts against a finding of fair use under the second
factor. 20 7
Regarding the third factor-the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole-the court
noted that "it is undisputed that downloading or uploading MP3 music files
involves copying the entirety of the copyrighted work."2 8 Before Sony, the
Ninth Circuit held that "such 'wholesale copying of copyrighted material
precludes application of the fair use doctrine.' "2' Despite this, after Sony
(which addressed copying for private home use), such copying "tips the fair
use analysis in the plaintiffs favor, if [the] copying is likely to adversely
affect the market for the copyrighted material."2 "0
As for the fourth factor, the court found that the MP3 copying by
Napster users would, in fact, have an adverse effect on the market for
copyrighted music 1 The court was correct here in considering the
relatedness of the substitution consideration of the third factor with the
market effect of the fourth.212 The court found that Napster use harms the
market by reducing CD sales among college students, presumably because
the MP3s downloaded by college students were being used as a substitute
for CDs."3 The court also found that Napster use hampers the RIAA's
efforts to enter the digital music download business.214 Again, after an
204 Id.
205 Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
(holding that copying to save users expense of purchasing authorized copies has
commercial character and thus weighs against a finding of fair use).
210 See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.2 7 Id. at 913 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 563 (1985)).208 Id.
29 Id. (quoting Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1983)).
210 Id.
211 See id.
2 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
213 See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
214 Id.
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analysis of these four factors, Judge Patel found that each favored the
plaintiff recording industry.215
In response, Napster asserted that its service was capable of several fair
uses, as defined in Sony,216 "including sampling, space-shifting, and the
authorized distribution of new artists' work."21 As for sampling,1 Judge
Patel began by noting that "[s]ampling on Napster is not a personal use in
the traditional sense ... [which is] copying which occurs within the
household and does not confer any financial benefit on the user."29
The sampling that occurs on Napster, Judge Patel continued, is
fundamentally different than the "time-shifting" argument accepted by the
Supreme Court in Sony.20 In Sony, the programs viewed were, in essence,
free of charge to the viewer." However, the record companies "almost
always charge for their music-even if it is downloaded song by song.
They only make promotional downloads available on a highly restricted
basis."'m Even when the RIAA allows websites to stream samples of their
songs, they still eam royalties.'m
Judge Patel found additional reasons why the sampling on Napster was
not akin to the time shifting in Sony. The viewers in Sony, she stated, "did
not distribute taped television broadcasts, but merely enjoyed them at
home."2 4 Napster users, on the other hand, have the potential to broadcast
the songs they have sampled to millions of other users.' Sampling, it
followed, "may quickly facilitate unauthorized distribution at an exponen-
tial rate."'26 Similarly, Napster argued that the sampling on their service
was analogous to listening to songs playing in a record store, or on a retail
website.2' Judge Patel thought the crucial difference between the types of
sampling is that with Napster, "users can keep the music they download."22 '
2
'Judge PatelIssues Written RulingExplaining Napster Decision, supra note
199, at 3.216 See supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text
217 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
218 Napster argued that the sampling its users participated in was an "initial
listen" to a song before the decision to purchase an entire album. See id. at 913-14.219 Id. at 913.
220 See id.
221 Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417,449 (1984).
2 2Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (citations omitted).
223 See id.
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 914.
[VOL. 89
2000-20011 WHO SAID NOTHING IN THIS WORLD IS FREE?
For these reasons, Judge Patel rejected Napster's sampling fair use
argument229Napster was not even saved by its contention that sampling on
its service actually stimulates CD sales, as "[a]ny potential enhancement of
plaintiffs' sales due to sampling would not tip the fair use analysis
conclusively in favor of [the] defendant."' m
Napster attempted to promote "space-shifting" as a fair use,"1 as it
believed that "space-shifting" was sufficiently analogous to the time-
shifting in Sony to invoke protection. 2 Napster cited to the Fader report, 23
which allegedly revealed that at least seventy percent of Napster users
sometimes engaged in space-shifting.' In contrast the RIAA cited to the
Jay Report, which opined that forty-nine percent of survey respondents
previously owned less than ten percent of the music they obtained from
Napster.235 Judge Patel held that neither of these statistics mattered in truth,
as the argument was easily distinguishable from the Sony case 6 Sony
applied when the time-shifting was theprincipal use of the VCR, implying
that no matter which report one might rely on, space-shifting was not a
principal use of Napster, thus defeating Napster's argument.? 7
Napster attempted a "bootstrapping" argument of sorts, reasoning that
if space-shifting was found to be a fair use, then it was protected by the
229 See id
230 Id.
11 Id. at 915. The "space-shifting" argument was borrowed from Recording
Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the "Rio Player," a portable MP3 player, was not
protected by the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") of 1992). Napster, 114 F.
Supp. 2d at 915 & n.19. In Diamond Multimedia, the court stated that making
copies with the Rio player to "space-shift, or make portable, files already on a
user's hard drive" was a non-commercial personal use. Id. at 915 n.19 (citing
Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079). Applied here, it would seem to imply that
Napster users were simply shifting music they already owned to the hard drive of
their computers. Judge Patel dismissed this dicta as having limited relevance, due
largely to the fact that the AHRA did not apply to Napster's circumstances. See id.
232 See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
233 The Fader Report, relied on by Napster, and the Jay report, relied on by the
RIAA, contain statistical analysis on the various effects of the Napster service on
consumers and music sales. See id. Although the reports were used respectively by
both parties in support of numerous arguments, the court made no qualms that it
gave greater credence to the Jay report. See id.
2 Id.
23S Id.
236 Id.
237 See id.
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substantial non-infringing use, or staple article of commerce, doctrine of
Sony. 8 The court quickly pointed out that Napster had failed, in the first
place, to "show that space-shifting constitutes a commercially significant
use of [the service]." 9 The huge growth ofNapster was not substantially
due to users space-shifting music they already owned; rather, it was due to
the "vast array of fiee MP3 files offered by other users."' Thus, the court
continued, even if it found space-shifting to be a fair use, it was not
substantial enough to be saved by the staple article of commerce doctrine
of Sony.241
Further, for the purposes of the staple article of commerce doctrine, the
court thought it of great import that Napster exercised ongoing control over
its service. 2 As Judge Patel noted, in Sony, the" 'only contact between
Sony and the users of the Betamax... occurred at the moment of sale.' '243
In contrast, Napster has central servers that users must access to swap
files.2' Judge Patel noted that while courts have protected defendants for
the manufacture and sale of devices under Sony, that same protection has
generally not been extended to cover situations in which "the defendant
continues to exercise control of the device's use."245 In sum, the court
declined to extend the staple article of commerce doctrine of Sony to
Napster, as its activities "smack[ed] of contributory infringement."21
238 See id.
29 Id.
24Id.
"I Id. (citing Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902
F.2d 829,846(1 lthCir. 1990) (affirming findingofcontributory infringement where
defendantprimarilypromoteddevices capableofdesramrblingpay-TVbroadcasts as
infringement aids); A&M Records, Inc. v. Gen. Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 1449,1456 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (rejectingSonydefensebecause counterfeitingwas
chief purpose of time-loaded cassettes that defendant sold)).242 Id.
243 Id. at 916-17 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417,438 (1984)).244 See id. at 907.
245Id. at 917 (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59,
62 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that business that rented rooms in which public
viewed copyrighted video cassettes engaged in contributory infringement, even
when the business was not the source of cassettes); General Audio Video, 948 F.
Supp. at 1456-57 (finding Sony inapplicable to a seller of blank tapes who "acted
as a contact between his customers and suppliers of other materials necessary for
counterfeiting"); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that defendant in position to control cassette-copying
machine could not claim protection under Sony)).
2"ld.
[VOL. 89
2000-2001] WHo SAID NOTHNG iN THIs WORLD IS FREE?
Napster's last fair use argument was that it engaged in "the authorized
promotion of independent artists, ninety-eight percent of whom are not
represented by the record company plaintiffs." '247 The court doubted
Napster's contention, believing that major recording stars were Napster's
main priority.24 In fact, the court stated that discovery revealed that former
Napster CEO Eileen Richardson had no fewer than five Madonna files
obtained from Napster on her own hard drive.249 Judge Patel also implied
that Napster was "covering itself' regarding the New Artist Program, as it
wasn't instituted until after RIAA filed suit. ° Indeed, the percentage of
new artists found on the service remained small even at the time of the
court's decision." As the court found that "Napster's primary role of
facilitating the unauthorized copying and distribution established [sic]
artists' songs renders Sony inapplicable," 2 the defenses of fair use and
substantial non-infringing use wholly failedNapster' 3 After having found
that the plaintiffs would likely be successful on both the contributory and
vicarious infringement claims and that the defenses of fair use and
substantial non-infringing uses were of no avail, Judge Patel granted the
RJAA's request for an injunction of Napster's activities."
4. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Defendant Napster moved for summary judgment early in the
proceedings, arguing that it fell within safe harbor provision 17 U.S.C. §
512(a) of the DMCA. 5 If this motion had been successful, the plaintiff
record companies would have been prevented from obtaining both
monetary damages and injunctive relief&' Due to the novelty of the
DMCA, there was virtually no precedent for the court to follow in the
247Id.
241See id.
249 Id.
250 See id.
25 See id.
11 Id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Gen. Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 1449,1456-57 (C.D. Cal. 1996); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 335,339 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
2DSee id.
m Id. at 927.
11 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746-47 (N.D.
Cal. 2000). For a discussion of the requirements of the safe harbor in 17 U.S.C. §
512(a) of the DMCA, see supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
256 See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
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disposition of the issue."' Indeed, the court noted that interpretation of any
of the § 512 safe harbors "appears to be an issue of first impression." ' The
principal issue at hand was whetherNapster was a service provider that, for
the purposes of § 512(a), "transmit[ted], rout[ed] or provid[ed] connections
for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the service provider.!" 9
The first issue the court dealt with was whether information actually
passed through the Napster system. It would have been a much easier
argument for Napster if the MP3 files had actually passed through its
servers, as this would obviously seem to satisfy the "through a system"
requirement. Napster, however, expressly denied that this happened.'
Napster contended that the files were transmitted" 'from the Host user's
hard drive and Napster browser, through the Internet to the recipient's
Napster browser and hard drive."' 26 ' Judge Patel noted, however, that the
Internet cannot be considered "a system or network controlled or operated
by or for the service provider."262
In an attempt to avoid this finding, Napster argued that both its servers
and the browsers on users' computers were included in the composition of
Napster's overall system.2 The court found that even if this were true, the
transmissions still occurred overthe Intemet, bypassing the Napster servers
in their entirety.2 That meant, according to the court, that "even if each
user's Napster browser is part of the system, the transmission goesfrom
one part of the system to another, or between parts of the system, but not
'through' the system."'265 For the safe harbor of § 512 to apply, the legis-
257 Id. at 1747.
2 Id. at 1748.
259 Id. (emphasis added). It is important in this analysis to remember that the
Napster system keeps file lists on its servers. It also provides the IP address
necessary for a transfer to take place between two users, but that transfer occurs
through the computers of the users, not Napster's central system. See supra notes
9-29 and accompanying text.
m See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. Indeed, "ifNapster were doing
more to facilitate the transfer of music files by providing connections through its
own system rather than users' and hosts' systems, the safe harbor provision might
apply." David P. Miranda, Safe Harbor Provisions ofDMCA Denied in Napster
Copyright Infringement Case, INTELL.PROP.L. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n), Summer
2000, at 30.26 1 Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (quoting Def. Reply Br. at 3).
262 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. IV 1999)).
263 Id
264 dSee i.
wId.
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lative history shows that the service provider must" '[play] the role of a
"conduit" for the communications of others.' "26Napster, Judge Patel held,
was not a "conduit" as required by § 512; while it may have enabled users
to connect with each other, those connections do not pass through its
system as required by the provision. 67
The different ways to invoke § 512(a) were held by the court to be
independent of each other.268 Thus, although Napster failed the "through the
system" test, analysis of the "routing" and "providing connections" safe
harbors of § 512(a) were still required 69 The court began this next phase
by noting that Napster had failed to adequately distinguish between
"routing" and "providing connections" in its brief.27 It doubted that
Congress would have used the two different terms if it had, in fact, intended
for them to have the same meaning." Nevertheless, it was held that the
"route of the allegedly infringing material goes through the Internet from
the host to the requesting user, not through the Napster server."2 2 This
route is the same path found in the "through the system analysis."2" 3 Since
the files were routed through the Internet, and not the Napster system, §
512(a) was inapplicable.27
Even assuming that the court had found the requirements of § 512
satisfied, there are further requirements for protection under the DMCA. A
service such as Napster must show that it has adopted and implemented a
"Copyright Compliance Policy '275 as required by § 512(i).276 Judge Patel
266 Id. at 1752 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551(1), 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1998), 1998 WL 414916, at *130).
267 See id.
m Id. at 1750.
u9 See id. at 1750-51.
270 See id. at 1752.
271 Id.
2n2 I/d.
273 Compare id. at 1750, with id. at 1752.
274 Id. at 1752.
275 Id.
276 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (Supp. IV 1999). The provision in its entirety states:
The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a
service provider only if the service provider-
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers
and account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a
policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network who are repeat infringers; and
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found that Napster did, in fact, have in effect a policy by which it would
block a copyright infringer's password so that password could not be used
to log onto the service.2 The "block," however, did not bar the infringer's
IP address from the system, thus allowing the infringer to sign up under
another password.2 There was also evidence that Napster did not put its
policy in writing for their users to inspect until two months after the lawsuit
was filed. 9 The court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Napster had adopted a "reasonable" policy for terminating
repeat infringers; as such, it refused to grant defendantNapster's motion for
summary judgment." ° To put it lightly, all of Napster's arguments under
the DMCA appeared to fail miserably.
B. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
1. Addressing the District Court's Substantive Law Analysis
Napster appealed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
in favor of the RIAA to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.281 The
court began by noting that it "review[s] a grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion,"282 and that "[a]pplication of erroneous
legal principles represents an abuse of discretion by the district court."2 3
With these principles in mind, the court addressed each of the district
court's substantive law findings in turn.
The court agreed with the district court's findings of direct infringe-
ment by Napster users.2 ' It noted that the RIAA had demonstrated
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical
measures.
Id. 2
-n Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
27 See id. There was also evidence that even in the face ofNapster's policy, a
"banned" user could manipulate the system into believing that it had never seen
either the banned user or that user's computer before, once again allowing access.
Id. The parties disputed whether blocking the IP address entirely would even be
possible. Id.
279 See id.
280 See id. at 1753.
8 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
282 Id. at 1013 (citing Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087,1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
bane)).
11 Id. (citing Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
band)).
2 See id. at 1014.
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ownership, and that Napster users infringed on "at least two of the
copyright holders' exclusive rights: the rights odreproduction, [17 U.S.C.]
§ 106(1); and distribution, [17 U.S.C.] § 106(3)." In truth, the court only
briefly touched on the issue, as Napster had not appealed the direct
infringement fimding 2" After the finding of direct infringement, the court
turned to Napster's fair use arguments.
The court analyzed Judge Patel's findings under each of the § 107
factor? 7 and found that the district court had neither abused its discretion
nor erroneously applied the facts to the fair use factors.' It also agreed
with Judge Patel's exclusion of sampling 9 and space-shifting 9 as fair
uses. The RIAA did not attempt to counter Napster's fair use argument
under Napster's new artist program; as such, it was a non-issue on
appea 91 In sum, the court found no error in Judge Patel's finding that
Napster did not have an effective fair use defense.'
The court turned next to the district court's finding that the plaintiffs
would likely succeed on their contributory infringement claim. The court
broke the claim down into its two separate elements: knowledge and
material contribution.293 Judge Patel's finding of actual knowledge was not
disturbed, but the court thought it necessary to make several points
regarding the knowledge requirement.? 5 The court stated that it would not,
due to the principles of Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,' "impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants made
and sold equipment capable of both infringing and 'substantial noninfring-
ing uses.' "297
Followingthatrationale, the courtwould "not impute the requisite level
of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technol-
ogy may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights."298 The court departed
235 Id.
U6 See id.
287 See id. at 1014-17.
288 Id. at 1017.
29 Id. at 1019.290 Id.
29 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 1020, 1022.
294 See id. at 1020.
295 See id. at 1020-22.
2 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
297 Napster, 239 F.2d at 1020 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
29 Id. at 1020-21 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436 (rejecting argument that merely
supplying the" 'means' to accomplish an infringing activity leads to the imposition
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
from the district court's finding "that Napster failed to demonstrate that its
system [is] capable of commercially significant substantial non-infringing
uses."'2 It believed that Judge Patel had erroneously "confined the use
analysis to current uses, ignoring the systems capabilities." 3°° Sony directed
that a court should consider whether the product or service is capable of
commercially significant non-infringing uses; the district court had placed
too much emphasis on current infringing uses.301
The significance of this departure from the district court's reasoning
may at first seem elusive. In essence, it means that if the district court, on
remand, finds that Napster has substantial non-infringing uses, it must find
actual knowledge on the part of the service before it may find them to be
a contributory infringer. The court explained this concept more clearly by
stating that, "absent any specific information which identifies infringing
activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory
infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the
exchange of copyrighted material." 2 This sidebar of the court, however,
did not prevent the RIAA's demonstration of a likelihood of success on a
contributory infringement claim. 3 The court agreed with the district court
that Napster had actual knowledge. 304 This, coupled with the court's
endorsement of Judge Patel's finding of material contribution, led to
agreement with the district court that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on
their contributory infringement claim.35 Although the court did not disturb
the district court's findings, the Sony discussion was undoubtedly a factor
in its decision to limit the injunction.3°
The court continued and addressed the vicarious infringement claim.
As discussed earlier, vicarious infringement has two elements: financial
benefit and control.307 The court agreed with the district court's finding that
the RIAA had shown it would likely succeed in establishing Napster's
financial benefit.308 The court concurred with Judge Patel that, like the
swap meet in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the infringement
of liability")).
299 Id. at 1021.
30 Id.
311 See id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-43).31 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436, 442-43).
303 See id. at 1022.
304 Id.
305 See id.
3 See infra notes 324-34 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
308 SeeNapster, 239 F.3d at 1004, 1023.
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occurring on Napster acted as a "draw" to attract more users.3 9 It agreed
only in part, however, with Judge Patel's finding that Napster exercised
control over its users.31°
The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that Napster
had the right to control its users, as it has an express reservation of rights
policy on its website stating that "it expressly reserves the 'right to refuse
service and terminate accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not limited
to, if Napster believes that user conduct violates applicable law... or for
any reason in Napster's sole discretion, with or without cause.' "" In
addition to finding that Napster had the right to control its users, the district
court also found that Napster had "failed to exercise that right to prevent
the exchange of copyrighted material."3 2 The problem with this latter
finding, the appellate court reasoned, was that it "fail[s] to recognize that
the boundaries of the premises that Napster 'controls and patrols' are
limited."313 The court cited several cases in which, in addition to having the
right to exclude persons, a defendant actually controlled and patrolled its
premises."' The problem with Napster's reservation of the right to police
is that its ability to actually do so was restricted by the structure of the
system.315 The Napster system only checked to see if files were in the
proper MP3 format; it did not read them to see if they contained copy-
righted material 6 The court did note, however, that Napster could use the
search engines it provided to find infringing material just the same as its
users could.317 As such, the court found that Napster's file name indices
were within the "premises" that Napster had the ability to police.31
Although this finding did not lead the court to disturb the district court's
" See id. (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64
(9th Cir. 1996)).
3 10 Id.
311 Id. (alteration in original).
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 See id. (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63 (stating that in addition to having
the right to exclude vendors, defendant "controlled and patrolled" the premises);
Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. NevadaTIIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D.
Mass. 1994) (noting that in addition to having the contractual right to remove
exhibitors, trade show operator not only reserved the right to police, but actually
had employees walk the aisles to ensure compliance)).315 See id. at 1024.316 See id.
317 See id.
3 18 Id.
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findings regarding vicarious infringement, 3 9 it greatly affected the court's
finding that the injunction was overbroad. 2
With regard to the DMCA, the court did not feel it necessary to make
a finding on the merits.32 ' Nonetheless, the court disagreed with the notion
"that Napster's potential liability for contributory and vicarious infringe-
ment renders the Digital Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable per so."32
The court thought that the issue would be more fully developed at trial and
that, for the time being, the balance of hardship tipped in the RIAA's favor,
supporting the issuance of the preliminary injunction. 3
2. Addressing the District Court's
Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
The Ninth Circuit believed that, in light of its opinion, the preliminary
injunction ordered by Judge Patel was overbroad." It reiterated that
Napster could only be deemed a contributory infringer if it: "(1) receive[d]
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings; (2) [knew] or should [have known] that
such files [were] available on the Napster system; and (3) fail[ed] to act to
prevent viral distribution of the works."3' As dictated by Sony, contribu-
tory infringement should not be found unlessNapster received actual notice
of infringing files and then failed to remove that material.326 As for
vicarious infringement, Napster "may be vicariously liable when it fails to
affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to
potentially infringing files listed in its search index."327 Napster had the
ability to use its search engine to find infringing material and to ban users
who possessed it.328
In light of these findings, the court concluded that the injunction was
overbroad because it placed the burden wholly on Napster to ensure "that
no 'copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing' of
319 See id.
31 See infra notes 324-34 and accompanying text.
321 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
322 Id.
323 See id.
324 See id. at 1027.
325 Id.
326 See id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417,442-43 (1984)).
327 Id.
328 Id.
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plaintiffs' works occur on the system." 329 Since the court held that Sony
demanded actual knowledge on the part ofNapster, it shifted the burden to
the RIAA to inform Napster of infringing files on its service.3 0 It was only
after being informed by plaintiffs that Napster would have a duty to
prohibit access to infringing users.331 But the court still demanded that
Napster police its system to the extent possible332 The court recognized that
the process of policing was not an "exact science," due largely in part to the
fact that it was users who named the files, making it possible to conceal
infringing material from Napster.333 On remand, the district court was
ordered to "recognize that Napster's system does not currently appear to
allow.., access to users' MP3 files."334
Despite the remand for injunction modification, it is difficult to dispute
that the appellate review was more than a small victory for the RIAA. The
court agreed with the findings in the plaintiff's favor on nearly every
substantive issue.33 Indeed, Hilary Rosen, president and chief executive
officer of the RIAA, stated that it was "a clear victory."336 Nonetheless,
Napster has vowed to pursue every legal avenue available before giving up,
beginning with a request that the Ninth Circuit reconsider its decision.337
Sean Fanning, founder ofNapster, promised that they would find a way to
keep the Napster community growing, stating that this is not the first time
that the system had faced adversity.338 When the system first started, he
says, people said that it would never work; now, it is the method by which
more than fifty million people get the music they want.339
IV. FORUMS OF RESOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVES EXPLORED
A. Traditional Means: The Courts and the Legislature
The RIAA, in response to the Napster phenomenon, ran straight to the
courts to straighten out the mess in which it found itself. This certainly
329 Id.
330 See id.
331 See id.
332 Id.
333 See id.
33 Id.
331 See supra notes 284-320 and accompanying text.
336 Napster Says it WillAppeal Ruling, at http://www.cnn.com/200 1/LAW/02/
12/napster.decision.04/index.html (Feb. 12,2001).
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
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sounds rational; if a person is being harmed by another, he takes his
problems to the judiciary. That may have been the most logical means to
solve problems such as this in the past. Here, however, even if the RIAA
is successful in its suit, it is still staring the peer-to-peer file sharing
revolution squarely in the face. The hectic pace oftechnological change, as
compared to the speed ofjudicial and legislative responses, incites doubt
in courts' and legislatures' ability to provide timely solutions.
As an initial matter, it is sometimes difficult for judges and justices,
some of whom have sat on the bench for decades, to understand the
technology involved in a case such as the Napster suit. "[S]ince we have
courts trying to make decisions that have significant ramifications based on
a less than a sophisticated understanding of the technology they're
addressing, the problems are going to get worse before they get better."'
Perhaps the largest problem with a court-mandated solution is that every
time decisional law is propounded for a particular technology, that
technology changes again, weakening the precedential force of decisions
regarding that technology.341
Such a problem has never been more evident than in the Napster case.
The RIAA has made Napster its target, while in the meantime programs
such as Gnutella and Freenet have come about which have taken the
concept to an entirely different level.342 Even "if a judge enjoins Napster,
there are five or six more companies that have already launched similar
products." 3' Further, the Internet is an application that is not held in check
by traditional boundaries; even conceding an RAA victory againstNapster,
clones are already being set up in other countries around the world to
circumvent the ruling.3"
Due in large part to the aforementioned problems with a judicially-
mandated solution, many "stakeholders are looking for legislated solu-
tions."' At least one commentator believes that the problem will be solved
"in large part through legislation," 3' while another has noted that the courts
340 Lee, supra note 54.
341 See id.
342 See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
343 J. William Gurley, Want to Stop Napster? Forget it-It's Too Late, FORTUNE,
May 1, 2000, at 326.
'4 Benyamin Cohen, And the BandPlayed On, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.
(Am. Lawyer Media), Sept. 29, 2000, at 7, WESTLAW, FULTONDAILY
Database.
Lee, supra note 54.
3 Id.
[VOL. 89
2000-2001] WHO SAID NOTHING IN THIS WORLD IS FREE?
will be stuck in the role of "devising the game plan"'347 while the legisla-
tures watch, learn, and "figure out who has what rights." Although
Congress has yet to take any real action regarding peer-to-peer file sharing,
it has already felt the pressure radiating from the controversy.
Indeed, in July of 2000, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a media
circus of a hearing which involved Lars Ulrich ofMetallica 9 and Napster
CEO Hank Barry?5 While Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) emphasized his
desire for a marketplace solution to the Napster problem,35 he warned that
if that does not happen, the legislature will act."' Members appeared to be
wrestling with the issue, as Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-San Jose)
asked: "Is it like a kid lending a CD to a friend, or like a kid going into a
warehouse and pocketing as many CDs as possible?"'3 After the hearing,
Hatch and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), ranking minority member on the
Judiciary Committee, were bombarded with more than "40,000 e-mails
from Napster users, expressing support for Napster and thanking the
senators for holding a fair hearing." 4 The Napster case has become a huge
issue, and Jeanne Lopatto, spokeswoman for the committee, admitted that
"[i]t was pretty taxing on the Senate system." 5
Assuming that Congress does decide to act, it certainly will not be a
resolution that is problem-free. As an initial matter, our legislature, even if
it makes Napster-type servers illegal, has very little control over the clones
launched in other countries. To totally shut down the revolution would
347 Id.
34 Id.
19 The rock group Metallica has been at the forefront of artists speaking out
against Napster, with member Lars Ulrich thrusting himself into the center of the
controversy. See Patrick Thibodeau, Napster Users Create Legal Gray Area for
Employers, athttp://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/07/17/napster.liability.
idg/index.html (July 17, 2000). Metallica is one of several artists who have filed
its own suit against Napster asserting copyright infringement. See Internet Music
Debate Moves to Washington, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/05/24/mp3.
napster.suit/index.html (May 24, 2000). Rapper Dr. Dre has filed suit as well.
Id.
3 0 Tatiana Boncompagni, Copyright Haves, Have-Nots Take Fight to Hill,
RECORDER (San Francisco), Aug. 18, 2000, at 3, WESTLAW, RECORDER-SF
Database.
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"require the Internet equivalent of wiretapping, which would send privacy
advocates into a frenzy.""5 6
Moreover, there is a concern that Congress faces the same problems as
the judiciary; despite the fact that it can act much more swiftly, technology
is changing at an even quicker pace. One need look no further than the
DMCA357 for an example. The DMCA was enacted for copyright manage-
ment information protection, as well as protection for online service
providers.35 In the author's opinion, the reason that Napster does not
qualify under the DMCA is not truly because it fails to satisfy § 512(a).
Rather, it is because the DMCA, enacted only two years ago by Congress,
in all likelihood could not imagine a service like Napster. It would seem,
then, that the legislature, like the courts, cannot move quickly enough to
respond to technological change.
B. Copyright Protection Technology
The Napster suit involves, as discussed earlier, the complaint by the
RIAA that copyrighted material is being distributed without royalties being
paid to the appropriate parties.359 One solution that is being explored by the
RIAA and other interested parties involves looking into various ways to
protect copyrighted material through the use of technologically-advanced
copyright protection." The term coined for this protection effort by the
RIAA is "digital rights management," and through it the copyright owners
would control whether a user could download a song for free.36" ' These
efforts to protect copyrighted works have taken two paths: protection by (1)
"marking" the copyrighted file itself, and (2) building copyright protection
right into the media player.362
The RIAA certainly has not kept its efforts a secret, announcing in late
2000 that it was "developing a standardized system to identify digital files
of songs, much like the way bar codes identify physical CDs in stores."36
356Gurley, supra note 343, at 326.
3 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
358 See Socolow & Guerette, supra note 160.
359A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd inpart and rev'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
' See Steven Fyffe, Napster Wars: Will it Hurt MP3?, ELECTRONIC NEWS,
Aug. 21, 2000, 2000 WL 9580955.
361 Id.
362 See id.
363 ID Code in Developmentfor DigitalMusic, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 13, 2000,
2000 WL 28195540.
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Under this system, a digital music file would have a number encoded into
it that would make it much easier to "monitor sales, usage and royalty
payments.""3 The code could also be changed from application to
application; for example, the file could be specially coded if, for promo-
tional purposes, the owner wanted users to be able to download the song for
free3 65 Conversely, if the file was one that the owner did not want users to
obtain for free, it would be coded appropriately. 3"
The other side of the coin is building protection right into the media
player, an idea that has been proposed to the RIAA by Oak Technology,
Inc. 67 David Ujita, vice president of corporate marketing for Oak Technol-
ogy, explains that"[o]ur proposal is right at the chip level .... If [the media
player] sees a copyright-protected file trying to pass through and a
consumer trying to bum a CD, the [installed] chip would disallow that."368
While the company admits that the chip would make players more
expensive, and that the process will certainly take time, it believes that its
proposal will be more resistantto hackers and pirates than a software-based
solution would.369
These proposals seem to ensure the elimination of the problems created
by Napster, but a closer inspection reveals the problems inherent in each
proposal. As far as a software-based solution, where the file itself is coded
to prevent free use, copyright owners will face serious problems with
hackers. The major problem with this solution to piracy is that it allows the
music, whether free or not, to be played.37 Hackers have proven that they
have the means to turn a protected file into one that is no longer protected
once it is, in fact, played 7 Indeed, this problem will continue to exist "as
long as recorded music can be played. '3 2
For example, users of the Linux operating system, a rival of Windows
and Macintosh, cannot watch DVDs on their systems, as they are specially
encoded to prevent such a use 73 Despite this, afifteen-year-old boy in
Norway developed a program, called DeCSS, that broke the code.374 The
364Id.
365 See id.
366 See id.
31 See Fyfee, supra note 360.
368 Id.
369 See id.
370 See Gurley, supra note 343, at 326.
371 See id.
372 Id.
31 See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 40.
374 See id.
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code was posted on awebsite, and in all likelihood was used throughout the
world to circumvent the copyright protection technology.375 The industry
is going to have to do better than that if it wants the protection of the law,
says one Harvard professor.376 He believes that if a fifteen-year-old can
break the code, the industry simply doesn't deserve to be protected.3 7
The solution of putting a chip directly into the media player is not
foolproof either. "Pirates would eventually find some way to thwart the
system anyway.... It's something that's been tried before multiple times
in different forms and there is always a way around it. 378 There is,
however, a seemingly larger problem with this solution. Some experts
believe that putting a chip such as the one proposed into players "would
price MP3 players out of the consumer market .... 'The technology that
you would have to build into this system would push them far out of the
realm of the mass market, and you've killed what you were trying to
protect.' ,3 79 Why, the commentator continues, would you buy a product
that would prevent you from copying or listening to protected music, when
there are other players out there that would allow you to do so?380 Such a
dichotomy would force copyright owners to sue the manufacturers of the
MP3 players that did not comply; this would be a case that would, in all
likelihood, prove most difficult to win for the copyright owner.381
C. The Creation of a New Business Modelfor the RA-"Payfor Play"
Quite obviously, the RIAA is feeling the pinch of having its music
swapped and played for free. Numerous commentators believe that the best
way to deal with the problem is not through legal action, but through the
adoption ofa different business model. Indeed, one commentator has stated
that "the solution to invasion by new technology is ... 'not to frustrate
[the] technology, but to leverage it."' 3 2 For example, the introduction of
home video recorders initially troubled the movie industry; however, today
revenue from home video rentals make up a substantial part of total movie
375 See id.
376 See id.
3771d.
378 Fyfee, supra note 360, at 34.
379Id
380 See id.
381 See id.
382 Victoria Slind-Flor, Sky 'Isn't Falling' in Music World, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 7,
2000, at Al.
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studio revenues.38 3 Similarly, when radio stations began broadcasting
baseball games for free, there was an outcry by those financially involved
that the broadcast would hurt ticket sales.?" Today, the revenue that teams
make from television and radio broadcasts "dwarfs that of tickets."385 These
businesses changed their models as technology advanced. It appears, then,
that if the RIAA responds in the right way, it stands to profit from the
Napster revolution.
Indeed, the first steps were taken in that direction with a deal struck
between Napster founder Shawn Fanning and music giant Bertelsmann,
parent company to BMG.386 The deal, struck in late October of 2000,
involved Bertelsmann loaning upwards of fifty million dollars to Napster
to develop a new business model that would both protect copyrighted
material and pay royalties to the owners of those copyrights.387 If Napster
is successful in creating such a model, Bertelsmann will pull out as a
plaintiff in the suit against Napster, and users of the service will have
access to the BMG catalog-home to such artists as Carlos Santana,
Whitney Houston and Elvis Presley. 88 In exchange, Bertelsmann has the
option of owning a stake in Napster.389
In essence, Bertelsmann is asking Napster to become a "pay-for-play
service," obtaining royalties from the music downloaded without entirely
shutting down the peer-to-peer network. This solution, then, takes care of
both sides of the dispute--Napster gets to stay up and running, and the
music giants get their royalties. While it is, in the author's opinion, the best
solution, it is not without its problems as well. The first difficulty is a
technological one.
In agreeing to create a system that will protect and pay artists and
record companies, Napster has in essence taken on the task of creating a
membership-based service that prevents infringing material from passing
between users.3" This would require being able to distinguish between
infringing and non-infringing material, which Napster has already argued
383 See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Napster Threatens Copyright Law,
N.Y. L.J., July 11, 2000, at 3, WESTLAW, NY L Database.384 1d.
3851Id.
38 See Jenny Eliscu, Napster Goes Legit, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 14,2000, at 43.
BMG is one of the record labels involved in the suit against Napster. See id.387 See id.
388 See id.
389 See id.
3
1 See Spencer Ante, Tune In, Turn On, Pay Up, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 2000, at
52, 2000 WL 24486402.
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in court it is not capable of doing.9 1 Commentators say that if Napster
wants to succeed, it must overcome this hurdle.3" This is not, however, a
task that is totally infeasible. Bruce Ward, chief technology officer of
NetPD (whose software identifies pirated songs based on sound patterns),
says that"[i]fNapster wanted to clean up their service, we could help them
with that."393
The second problem with the Bertelsmann deal is that it would involve
Napster moving away from a model in which music is free to one in which
users have to pay a fee. The dispute begins by questions about how much
Napster should charge users in the use of its new model.3" According to
Napster CEO Hank Barry, the preliminary price being considered is $4.95
a month.3" As discussed earlier, however, file traders are loath to begin
paying for something they believe should be free.396 After the Napster-
Bertelsmann deal was struck, "websites all over cyberspace burned
fuiously... as Napster fans threatened to ditch the service if it charged as
much as a nickel for music-file access."3' Indeed, as Steve Gottlieb, the
president of New York indie label TVT states, "[o]nce you take Napster
and charge a subscription fee and make it secure, is it really a compelling
proposition?" 398
Why isn't it a compelling proposition? While the Napster deal as it
stands right now would allow users access to only those files owned by
BMG,39 if Napster struck deals with the other four major labels, the
content of the service would be the same as it is currently. Users can still
get the music they want, in the comfort of their homes, from other online
music lovers like themselves. This Napster user, for one, believes that
$4.95 a month is a small price to pay to be a member of the service that
changed the face of music forever. It is the only sensible solution and, given
a choice between a more controlled version of Napster and no version at
all, it is certainly the best solution on the table.
One limitation of a pay-for-play Napster is, however, that the choice
involves more than the dichotomy of a subscription service and no service
at all. As mentioned above, the Napster code has produced fewer lawsuit-
391 See id.
39 Id.
393Id
3 94 See Frank Gibney, Jr., NapsterMeister, TIME, Nov. 13,2000, at 58, 62.
39S See id.
39 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.39 Gibney, supra note 394, at 62.
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399 See id.
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prone clones!' ° This complication injects a costless substitute into the
analysis, begging the question: why should a user pay to use Napster when
there are programs such as Gnutella and Freenet4 available that can obtain
the same files for free? The answer is that we must provide economic
incentive to artists. During the French Revolution, for example, the new
National Assembly moved swiftly to eliminate copyright protection. 2 A
few years later, only pornography and seditious material were being
published, as there was no incentive to create anything of real worth.4 3 The
French had to revive copyrights in order to provide the incentives necessary
to produce works of more substance.
Admittedly, the primary purpose of copyright law is not to make profits
for the copyright holders, but to promote and encourage creative expression
for the benefit of the public.4 5 On the other hand, the United States is a
capitalist nation, and by giving copyright owners the exclusive right to copy
and distribute works the legal system gives them the power to exploit the
work commercially.' Much of the intellectual property law rationale is to
provide incentives to those who create and innovate, and this argument is
no less forceful when applied in cyberspace.4 7 If the economic incentive
to continue to create disappears, "it is beyond dispute that we will have less
artistic and inventive output. '° If artist compensation is taken away, then
those artists will be forced to resort to other means to put food on the table;
if that happens, everyone in society loses. °
One commentator asks readers to put themselves in the shoes of John
Lennon, Paul McCartney, George Harrison and Ringo Starr of the Beatles,
inferring that their creative output would have been lessenedif they had no
financial incentive to continue.41 Another critic of Napster says that he is
o See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 3046 and accompanying text.
0 See Hal R. Varian, RecordingIndushy Shaken by New Technology and Eco-
nomy, J. REC. (Okla. City), July 31, 2000, 2000 WL 14297249.
4 See id.
404 See id.
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406 See id.
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aware that a portion of the public thinks that making music is an art; as
such, artists should do it simply for the love of it. " ' Notwithstanding that
observation, how free will artists be to create, he continues, if they have to
spend all of their free time making a living by other means? 412 Without that
luxury time, he continues, no one knows the songs that might never have
been written."" Of course, there will be artists who will advocate and
support Napster's use, believing that their income will be boosted by other
elements-live performances, for example. The problem with an absolutely
"unfettered Napster... [is that it] forces this regime on those artists who
do not choose it."414 In sum, a total shutdown of the Napster service is an
unnecessary suppression of useful technology. With that in mind, however,
keeping Napster free removes the necessary incentive for artists to create.
Let's face it--nobody wants to work for free, not even musicians.
CONCLUSION
The future of music (and perhaps the future of computer programming
as well) has arrived in Napster, and it has brought a plethora of legal
problems along with it. The likes of a peer-to-peer sharing system such as
Napster has never been imagined before, and certainly has never been an
issue in front of our courts and legislatures. Napster not only poses
problems when examined under current copyright law and legislation, it is
a technology that is moving and expanding at a rate at which neither will
be able to keep pace. As much as lawyers, judges, legislators, and record
executives will hate to admit it, peer-to-peer file sharing involves issues
that cannot be resolved via traditional means. In the time it will take the
Napster case to be finally adjudicated, advances in technology will have
created entirely new legal issues to deal with all over again. The author
urges the parties involved to continue in the direction they are headed-
towards a new business model for the recording industry. It is the only
amenable solution when one finally admits the techno-legal and economic
problems posed by the inevitable continued use of peer-to-peer file sharing
technology.
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